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THE CAMPAIGN OF ARTEMISIUM AND THERMOPYLAE. B Y PROFESSOR
J. B. BURY.
Sailing in a coasting steamer from Athens to Volo, the traveller
passes by the region of land and sea in which the first great scene of
the second Persian War was enacted. He enters the Malian Gulf and
discerns Thermopylae in the distance; then he sails through the channel
between the Achaian and north Eubcean shores, and as he turns into
the Pagasaean basin seeks Aphetae somewhere on the right, while the
shore of Artemisium behind him stretches away towards the open sea.
If deciding to break his journey he disembarks at Stylida, and goes up
the bleak road to Lamia, he can ride or drive across the Malian plain,
offer his vows to the river Spercheios, and spend a day in the pass of
Thermopylae. Such a visit will indeed win him the power of realizing
more vividly the general features of the scene in which Leonidas and
his men faced the Persian host,—the hot springs, the road into Locris,
the dark sides of the frowning mountain, the point where the path taken
by Hydarnes ascends Mount Anopaia, honeycombed with holes, to
which, I presume, it owes its name. These things it is fully worth
while realising to the vision. But one must not expect to be able to
determine any minute topographical details.* This is not due to the
well-known fact that the natural features have changed within the last
two thousand years, by the advance of the land upon the sea. That
change can be sufficiently defined and easily allowed for. The difficulty
is due to the circumstance that Herodotus had not seen the place. His
general description is wonderfully true, but when it comes to the
position of the wall, or of the hill (KOXWVOS) on which the Greeks made
their last stand, we are clearly liable to reach false conclusions if we
press the words of one who had seen neither the place itself, nor a plan
of it.
For the study of the campaign, it is more important to grasp the
position of Thermopylae in relation to the waters in which the Persian
and Greek squadrons were stationed, than the topography of Ther-
mopylae itself. When we have realised this, we are led to a view
of the episode of Artemisium considerably divergent from that which
• One of the chief difficulties seemed to me to be the determination of the exact position of the
western gate of the pass.
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is presented by Herodotus. Here, as in other cases, Herodotus
himself gives us material for criticising his history.
1. ARTEMISIUM.
§ 1. The right understanding of the actions at Artemisium depends
on grasping the intimate connection between the land and the sea
forces. Co-operation of army and fleet was a fundamental principle of
the strategy of the Persians in their western expeditions. Darius in
his conquest of Thrace is supported by a fleet which coasts along to the
mouth of the Danube. A fleet co-operates with Mardonius in his re-
conquest of Thrace and Macedonia after the Ionic revolt. And in the
expedition of Xerxes, the navy, instead of (as we might expect) sailing
right across the Aegean to the country which was the object of the
expedition, coasts along Thrace and Macedonia, keeping pace with the
movements of the army. So important did this joint advance seem to
the Persians, that they undertook the great labour of digging a canal
across the peninsula of Mount Athos. A storm off that dangerous
promontory had wrought great havoc in the fleet of Mardonius; it was
in order to avoid the risk of the repetition of such a calamity, and yet
not separate the fleet from the army, that the canal was made. In the
passage through Thessaly the mountains cut off the army from the
coast; accordingly we find the fleet remaining at Therma (Salonica) for
about a week and a-half after the army started, so that both parts of the
expedition may reach the Malian gulf at the same time.
This principle of Persian strategy necessarily determined the strategy
of the Greeks. Their army and fleet had likewise to act in close con-
nection ; Artemisium and Thermopylae are the two parts of the same
operation. This inter-dependence is implied in the account of Herodotus,
but it is never clearly expressed. It is implied in the way in which he
passes from Thermopylae to Artemisium, then back to Thermopylae,
and then once more to Artemisium. It is implied in the circumstance
which he mentions that a boat was kept ready at Artemisium to carry
news to Thermopylae, and a boat at Thermopylae to carry news to
Artemisium, in case a disaster occurred at either place. It is implied
finally in the statement that the disaster at Thermopylae led at once to
the retreat of the Greek fleet. But nowhere does the historian seem
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more than dimly conscious of the inter-dependence. So far as he is
concerned, there is a superficial connection determined by an accident
of vicinity, instead of the vicinity being determined by an essential
connection in strategy. Modern critics have, of course, recognised the
inter-dependence, and emphasised it duly, but they have, I believe,
failed to draw the full logical consequences in criticising the Hero-
dotean story. For, viewed in the light of this principle, the narrative of
Herodotus exhibits certain incongruities with the actual situation.
§ 2. According to that narrative, while Leonidas and about 7,000
men station themselves at Thermopylae, the fleet under Eurybiades
takes up a position at Artemisium. Three Greek vessels are posted as
scouts near Sciathus, and two of these are captured. The news of this
incident has such a depressing effect upon the whole fleet, that they
immediately abandon their position at Artemisium and retreat to
Chalets. Thus the entrance to the Malian bay is open to the Persian
fleet, which now approaches and anchors off the coast called Sepias
Akte, on the south-east of Magnesia. The fleet is so numerous that it
is impossible to moor all the ships on the strand, and they are con-
sequently anchored in eight lines parallel to the shore. In this
position a great storm befalls them, and four hundred vessels, at the
lowest computation, are destroyed. The news of this disaster en-
courages the Greeks to return to their post at Artemisium. The
Persians then move round the south-east corner of Magnesia to Aphetae,
over against Artemisium ; and in the course of this movement, fifteen
of their ships were captured by the Greeks. But the Greeks, when
they saw the vast size of the hostile navy at Aphetae, notwithstanding
its great losses, were so disheartened, that they again resolved to
retreat to the Euripus. The influence of Themis tocles prevents them
from carrying out this resolve, and the opportunity of telling a charac-
teristic story about that general is not lost. Then the Persians
conceive the stratagem of sending two hundred ships to sail round
Euboea and through the Euripus to take the fleet in the rear. The
wonderful diver, Scyllias of Scione, deserts, and informs the Greeks of
this movement. Once more the Greeks determine to retreat to the
Euripus. They will sail under cover of night, but, in the meantime, as
they have an afternoon to spare, they attack the enemy in order to see
how they fight. Throughout the night there is heavy rain with
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thunder and lightning, and presumably we are supposed to understand
that the weather prevented the Greeks from carrying out the plan on
which the council of war had decided, of starting for the Euripus after
midnight. On the same night, the two hundred Persian ships, which
had been sent round, were caught in a storm off the south-west coast
of Euboea and all wrecked. The news of this occurrence, and the
arrival of a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships, gave the Greeks
new courage. They remained at Artemisium and had some further
indecisive engagements with the enemy, until the news of Thermopylae
compelled them to abandon their position.
§3. Now it is clear that in this narrative the necessary connection
between the position at Artemisium and the position at Thermopylae is
ignored. The retreat of the Greeks to the Euripus practically meant the
destruction of the company of Leonidas. It was not merely that it
enabled the Persian fleet to enter the Malian Gulf and support the army
at the pass itself, but it enabled them to land troops on the coast of
Locris behind the pass. As Grote says, "The occupation of the
northern part of the Euboean Strait was indispensable to prevent the
Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of
Thermopylae." We must therefore hesitate to believe that the Greek
commanders would have thus betrayed the whole position. There was
a reasonable chance of saving Greece by the natural advantages of
Thermopylae; would Eurybiades and his fellows, without being attacked,
long before the enemy came in sight, have deserted a post which
was the key to the defence of Thermopylae r The motive given—the
capture of a couple of ships which had been sent to bring news of
the approach of the Persians—is totally inadequate. Can we regard
such an incident as adequate to produce a panic among the sailors,
assumed by Grote in order to save the intelligence of the generals ?
But this attempt to rescue Herodotus involves us in inconsistencies
with another part of the Herodotean tale. When the two fleets are
actually over against each other, a retreat to the Euripus is again
resolved upon. In this case it is a question altogether of the com-
manders, not of the- men. The commanders are persuaded or bribed
into remaining, and consequently the fleet remains. How are we to
explain this ? (1) Was there a panic on both occasions ? If so, how did
the commanders, who were obliged to yield to the first panic, succeed in
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calming the second panic, although, in the actual presence of the enemy,
a panic ought to have been more irresistible than when the enemy
were leagues away ? (2) And, if there was no panic on the second
occasion, the old difficulty returns of discovering how Eurybiades and his
colleagues could in cold blood resolve to destroy the chances of saving
Thermopylae. Again, on a third occasion, when the news comes of the
sending of the two hundred ships, the commanders adopt the extra-
ordinary plan of leaving the whole position open to the main Persian
fleet. In short, the account of Herodotus is quite indifferent to the
most simple considerations of strategy.
The story then fails to sustain criticism, and we have not to go far
to discover its " motivation." The key lies in the part played by
Themistocles. We find the Athenian general doing at Artemisium
what he did afterwards at Salamis. It is he who hinders the fleet from
retreating on the second occasion to the Euripus, just as afterwards, at
Salamis, he hindered it from retreating to the Isthmus.
In fact, in the tale of Artemisium, the Euripus is made to play the
same role which the Isthmus actually played at Salamis. Like the
Isthmus, it appears as the spot after which the Greek commanders are
always secretly hankering, and for which they are ready to make sail
whenever they can find a pretext. Themistocles in both cases is the ex-
ception. Only, unfortunately for the story, the two situations were totally
different. At Salamis it was a matter of life and death only to the
Athenians, Megarians and Aeginetans, that, the fleet should remain
where it was. At Artemisium it was a matter of life and death for the
Peloponnesian confederates as well, inasmuch as a part of the Pelo-
ponnesian army was defending the pass of Thermopylae. At Salamis
it could be argued that to retire to the Isthmus was to bring the fleet
into close touch with the army, whereas, at Artemisium, to retire to the
Euripus was to give up that particular vicinity to the army on which
the fate of the army depended.
The inference is that the story which we read in Herodotus has
transferred, with an instinct which is justified by its success, the motives
which governed the Greek leaders at Salamis to their previous councils
at Artemisium. Neither the actual retreat, nor the two subsequent
unfulfilled intentions of retreat, to the Euripus, can be accepted as
historical facts. At the same time, it must be noted that the statement
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of an actual retreat requires some further explanation. It cannot be
dismissed as lightly as the unfulfilled intentions; for the question at once
presents itself: why does not a merely intentional retreat appear
in the first case also ? What was the ground of differentiation ? An
answer to this question will be offered at a later stage of the discussion.
§ 4. But the Euripus, although it did not play that part in the counsels
of the Greek generals which Herodotus assigns to it, must have in
another way seriously entered into the meditations of their strategy.
The danger that the Persians might send a squadron round the south
of Eubcea, and, passing the Euripus, land troops in Locris to take the gar-
rison of Thermopylae in the rear, and at the same time cut off the retreat
of the fleet, this was an obvious danger, the reality of which the Greeks
did not require the actual despatch of the two hundred ships to teach them.
The position at Artemisium resembled, in fact, the position at Thermo-
pylae, in so far as both positions were weakened by the necessity of
defending a collateral, though less easy and direct, passage. The
route by the Euripus demanded the same consideration from Eurybiades
which the mountain path demanded from Leonidas. It may be regarded
as certain that the Greeks did not intend to leave the Euripus unde-
fended. To do so would have been a fatal weakness in their whole
system of defence, and a weakness which, owing to the natural
advantages of the Euripus, could be avoided at a very small sacrifice of
the strength of the navy at Artemisium.
Is there any trace in our authorities—that is in Herodotus, for he is
really the only authority—of measures taken for the defence of the
Euripus ? The answer to this question is contained, I believe, in the
answer to another.
§ 5. The number of the Greek ships that took up their station at
Artemisium is stated* by Herodotus at 271 (not counting pente-
conters); of these triremes the Athenians contribute 147.t Suddenly,
on the day after the first naval engagement—the day succeeding the
night of the second storm which wrecked the two hundred ships off
the Hollows of Euboea—he becomes aware that the Athenians have
53 more triremes, which then arrive. " Fifty-three Attic ships brought
assistance to the Greeks." % What had these fifty-three ships been
doing, and why had they not appeared before? Herodotus does not
* viii. 2. t Twenty of them manned by Chalcidians. % viii. 14.
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attempt to account for them, and for that reason his statement of their
appearance at a late stage of the Artemisium episode carries the
more weight. It is a fact which occurs in his narrative, without any
" motivation," without any organic connection with his own presenta-
tion of the tale, and it is for that reason eminently entitled to credit.
Now we have seen that the defence of the Euripus was essential to
the Greek position. And here we find fifty-three ships absent from
the main squadron. The two facts seem to clamour against being kept
apart. The conclusion that the fifty-three ships had been set to guard
the Euripus is irresistible.
§ 6. It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, that these Attic
ships left their post at Chalcis, as a direct consequence of the destruction
of the two hundred Persian ships which had been sent round to pass
the Euripus. When this disaster occurred no further danger threatened
the Euripus from that side, and the garrison was therefore set free for
other duty. And a juxtaposition in Herodotus may be interpreted
as suggesting that the Attic ships even carried the news of the fate of
the Persian squadron to the Greek fleet at Artemisium. He says : " the
Greeks were encouraged by the arrival of these (Attic ships), and at the
same time by the news of the destruction of all those barbarians who
sailed round Eubcea." *
§ 7. We have now to consider this incident of the two hundred ships
related to have been wrecked off the Hollows of Eubcea. The relation
presents some serious difficulties which might easily tempt one to
reject the whole story.
In the early afternoon,f after the arrival at Aphetae, the Persians
selected two hundred good sailers, and sent them first northward so as
to circumnavigate Sciathus—a considerable round—" in order that they
might not be seen by the Greeks." They then proceed to number the main
body of the navy, and while they are thus engaged, the diver Scyllias
deserts and informs the Greeks of the sending round of the ships. The
Greeks call a council of war, and decide to wait till after midnight, and
then sail " to meet the ships that were sailing round." Then, as the
Persians do not attack them, they attack the Persians in the evening,^
and the first battle is fought. A stormy night ensues ; we hear nothing
more of the Greek intention to meet the ships that were sailing round ;
* viii. 14. f viii. 6. + viii. 9.
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but their ships, having reached the south-west coast of Eubcea, are
wrecked during the night.
Now of course it is quite impossible that ships, even the best that
the Persians could muster, should, leaving Aphetae shortly after 12 a.m.,
and sailing round Sciathos, circumnavigate the southern promontory of
Eubcea, and be wrecked off the Hollows during the following night. But
leaving aside this difficulty which besets the story, and supposing that
Herodotus has only made a mistake as to the time at which the detached
squadron started, we cannot understand the calculations of the Greeks.
Scyllias comes and tells them during the course of the day that this
squadron has started, and naturally he knew and was asked—for it was
a vital point—at what time it had started. Possessed of this information
the Greeks determine to go to meet the new danger, which, if any
sense is to be ascribed to the story, means that they were to go to pro-
tect the Euripus. But instead of doing so at once they decide to wait
till midnight. In other words they compute that, by leaving Artemi-
sium just after midnight, they will be able to reach the Euripus before
the Persians. But this computation is inconsistent with the circum-
stance that the Persians had rounded Geraestos, and were wrecked off
the south-western coast in the course of the night. It is clear from the
map that if no storm had interfered, the Persians would have passed
the Euripus before the Greek fleet came near it from the opposite
direction.
We have already seen that the intention of the Greeks to move
their fleet from Artemisium for the purpose of guarding the Euripus
cannot be taken as historical. If they had not already made provision
for the eventuality in question, they would have sent merely a detach-
ment, but they would have sent it at once, and run no risk of its not
arriving in time. Now we see that, even taking the story just as
Herodotus tells it, it does not hang together.
§ 8. Besides these incongruities in time, there is also an apparent
incongruity in place. The two hundred ships are sent
irtpiirhwovaai Evfioiav K. T. X.*
The ships therefore coast along Magnesia, turning Cape Sepias, and
• viii. 7.
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passing between Sciathos and the mainland, sail round that island and
then return southward. But if these ships could reach Cape Sepias
unseen by the enemy, what was to hinder them from sailing on due
eastward and then bearing south ? Wnat did they gain, except loss
of time, by sailing northward ? The movement would only be in-
telligible if Sciathos lay due east of the sound between Magnesia and
Eubcea.
§ 9. The consideration of these inconsistencies in the narrative of
Herodotus might tempt us to subscribe to a view, which has been
actually advanced,* that the incident of the two hundred ships is
entirely fiction. While the mere fact that such a view is held by an
able historical critic confirms us in our appreciation of the difficulties
which beset the incident as Herodotus represents it, at the same time this
view is not consonant with a satisfactory historical method. To reject
the truth of recorded occurrences, which involve difficulties but have
nothing miraculous about them, is to " cut the knot," unless one explains
how the story arose. The sending of ships round Eubcea was, in certain
circumstances, a perfectly intelligible stratagem, and there was nothing
miraculous in a misfortune happening to them off the Hollows of
Eubcea. The number of the ships sent round can in no case be
guessed. In numbering the forces of the Great King, Herodotus loses
all sense of actuality, and even when his numbers are not impossible
we cannot implicitly trust them.
§ 10. The same principle of historical method which requires us to
explain the episode of the two hundred Persian ships claims also an
explanation of the positive statement, that the Greek fleet retreated
from Artemisium to the Euripus and returned during the storm. It is
clear (as has been already remarked) that a statement of an actual
retreat stands on a different footing from the statement of an intention
to retreat, inasmuch as movements of ships or troops are more evident
than discussions in the council room. Thus our previous criticism on
the retreat to Euripus was so far imperfect, as it did not take account
of the difference in credibility between the actual retreat and the two
subsequent unfulfilled designs of retreat. In attempting to extract the
truth about the operations at Artemisium from the unintelligible account
of Herodotus, we have to seek a solution of the retreat to Euripus, as
* By Beloch.
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well as of the chronological and topographical difficulties connected with
the sending round of the Persian ships.
§ 11. It is time to point out in regard to these ships a new difficulty
which takes us a step forward on our way to the solution. On arriving
at Aphetae, the Persians, if they thought of despatching the ships, would
have taken pains to learn, and would have had no difficulty in dis-
covering whether the strait of Euripus was guarded by the Greeks. If
it were guarded, it would be foolish to weaken the fleet by sending a
detachment to attack a strong position. But we have already shown
ground for holding that the Euripus was guarded by a number of Attic
ships, which joined the main squadron at Artemisium on the day after
the arrival of the Persians at Aphetae. This consideration, combined
with the chronological inconsistencies already exposed, leads to the
result that ships were not sent from Aphetae to sail round Eubcea. But
this is very different from the conclusion that ships were not sent to
sail round Eubcea at all.
If then the two hundred ships (it is convenient to refer to them thus,
though we attach no importance to the number) were not sent from
Aphetae, and if nevertheless the main fact that they were sent is true—
and this we have as yet no ground ior questioning—it is dear that they
were sent before the Persians arrived at Aphetae. The three days
before the arrival of the fleet at Aphetae were the days of the storm, and
therefore days in which the ships could not have started. It follows
that they were sent the night before the storm, while the fleet was
anchored off the Sepiad A kte, over against the island of Sciathos.
§ 12. This conclusion is strikingly confirmed by the solution it
supplies of the topographical puzzle which occurred in, the Herodotean
narrative. We observed the inconsistency between the implication that
the two hundred ships could sail along the south coast of Magnesia
without the knowledge of the Greek fleet, and the positive statement
that in order not to be seen they had to make a detour round Sciathos.
But if the ships were despatched when the fleet was on the eastern
coast of Magnesia, opposite Sciathos, there is no such inconsistency.
There was evidently less chance of observation if they sailed round
between Sciathos and Peparethos, than if they sailed out south of
Sciathos.
§ 13. But the same objection which was alleged against the despatch
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of the ships from Aphetae may be urged against their despatch
from the Sepiad coast. There as well as at Aphetae the Persians must
have learned that the Euripus was guarded, and therefore put aside
the idea of circumnavigating Eubcea. It follows that, if the ships were
sent, the Athenian triremes ,had not yet been actually posted at the
Euripus when the Persian fleet arrived at Sepias Akte.
And this is the right conclusion ; for it furnishes at the same time
the solution of another, apparently independent but really connected,
problem. The importance of the Euripus was recognised, as we saw,
in the Greek system of defence; its security, we concluded, had been
provided for by the Greek generals. But two courses were open to them.
They could either station ships at the Euripus from the very beginning,
and thereby practically secure it against the chance of any Persian
attempt to pass i t ; or they might leave it without any defence until
the enemy arrived in the neighbourhood of Magnesia; in which case
the Persians learning that it was undefended might, as they actually
did, send a detachment round, thus weakening their main force, while
the Greek ships deputed for the purpose would in the meantime have
reached their post at Euripus.
§ 14. The development of our criticism of Herodotus has thus led
us step by step to the conclusion that, if the sending of the two hundred
ships is a historical fact, they were sent neither at the time, nor from the
place, alleged by Herodotus. (1) They were sent not from Aphetas
but from the Sepiad strand. (2) They were sent not after but before
the great storm. (3) At the time when they were sent, the Euripus was
still unguarded; but (4) shortly afterwards, was defended by fifty-three
Attic ships.
It follows that these Attic ships were moved to the Euripus after
the arrival of the Persians off the Magnesian coast, and the despatch of
the two hundred ships. And here we have the explanation of our
former puzzle, the retreat of the fleet to the Euripus. The despatch of
a large detachment of Attic ships to the Euripus is the kernel of fact
which is contained in, and accounts for, the incredible story that the whole
Greek fleet retreated to the Euripus. And Herodotus is so far right that
the movement, which he represents as the movement of the whole fleet,
ensued upon news from Sciathos. Only the news of importance was
not the capture of an ^Eginetan and a Trcezenian vessel; it was the news
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of the approach of the Persians, and then of their arrival and the
despatch of the " two hundred ships." We can now read in a new light
the words of the historian :—
Taj)ra ol 'EWrjves ol bn 'Apre/uaiti) OTpaTOTretevo/xevoi TtvvOavovTai irapa
•nepowv IK ^KICLOOV ' TrvBofievoi he ical KaTappwhrjaavres UTTO TOV 'Aprefiiaiov
ev XaA/«'8a, <f)v\ai;ovTes fiev TOV JLvpmov, KenrovTe? Be
irepl TO. v^rr/Xa T?J<S Eu/3ot'»/y.
There is no difficulty in understanding how, in the workshop which
fashioned the stories used by Herodotus for his history, the sailing of a
large squadron came to be represented as the sailing of the entire
armament; and this error, once admitted, led, of need, to further fiction.
When the fleet was taken to Chalcis, it had, somehow or other, to be
got back to Artemisium, and to be there, opposite Aphetae, when the
storm was over. Accordingly, clumsily enough, on the second day of the
storm it returns ; and the motive alleged for this return is the informa-
tion, derived from scouts on the Eubcean hills, that the Persians have lost
a great many ships in the storm. This part of the tale is simply a
consequence of the initial distortion of fact and, that being admitted,
demands no further consideration.
In regard to the fate of the " two hundred " ships, it follows that
they were destroyed in the great storm, which also wrought havoc in
the main fleet, and that they did not require a subsequent storm for
themselves. When the storm was over, the Athenian triremes at the
Euripus learned the news of their destruction, and, thus set free,
returned to Artemisium.
§ 15. The incident of Scyllias, the diver, has still to be taken into
account. Herodotus states that after the storm he informed the Greeks
that the ships had been sent round Eubcea. This is inconsistent with
our conclusions; and the question arises: Is the Scyllias incident merely
fabulous, and, if it took place, how has it been distorted to suit the
story ? The tale of the fabulous dive of Scyllias is not enough to dis-
credit the statement that Scyllias deserted and brought information to
the Greeks. Are we then to accept the statement that he announced
the sending round of the ships, and therefore transpose his arrival to
the day before the storm ; or are we to accept the chronological datum
that he deserted after the storm, while we assume that his information
was cf a totally different nature ? Fortunately Herodotus lets out the
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secret and enables us to see the suture in his story. Scyllias, as soon as
he arrived, " told the generals the history of the shipwreck, and about the
ships which had been sent round Eubcea."* For the Herodotean story
the second is the only important part of this information. According
to that story the Greeks already knew the main facts of the shipwreck;
the losses sustained by the Persians had been reported to them at the
Euripus and induced them to return. Scyllias might supplement their
knowledge in details—his own adventures for example, and the amount
of treasure he had laid hands upon. But the Greeks cannot have been
so wonderfully well informed during the storm as to the Persian losses,
and, when the storm had abated, it was a matter of great consequence
to them to learn the details. If Scyllias brought this information his
arrival was an event. We may therefore fairly infer that Scyllias did
announce T-YJV vavrpflrjv OT <yevoiTo. His coming was remembered; and
so he was the obvious person to be utilised when other news had
to be carried according to the exigencies of the story. Herodotus
has characteristically preserved in a subsidiary position the main
historical fact, which, after the rejection of the fictitious retreat to the
Euripus, is enabled to assume its proper significance.
§ 16. We have yet to consider, in this connection, a chronological
inconsistency in Herodotus. The difficulty lies in synchronizing the
events at Artemisium and the events at Thermopylae. The dates have
been conveniently set out by Busolt,t and may be arranged as follows,
beginning from the day on which Xerxes started from Therme :—
Day I Persian army leaves Therme.
„ 12 Morning: Persian fleet leaves Therme.
Evening : ,, ,, reaches Magnesian coast.
Morning: beginning of storm.
Storm continues.
>» tt
Storm ceases. Fleet moved to Aphetse.
First sea fight.
Arrival of 53 Athenian ships. Second sea fight.
Third sea fight. News of Thermopylae in the evening.
These are the unreconciled dates which are suggested by the narra-
tive of Herodotus. There is a discrepancy of two days. The question
•viii 8 ad fin. f Griechische Geschichte, ii. p. 681, n. 3 (ed. 2).
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„ 18
». >9
„ 20
„ „ reaches Malis.
First attack on Thermopylae.
Second „ ,, „
Defeat of the Greeks.
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is, whether the events at Artemisium have been erroneously compressed
or those at Thermopylae unduly stretched out. Busolt decides for the
former alternative, and supposes that two days (from afternoon of day
16 to afternoon of day 18) elapsed before the arrival of the Persian fleet
at Aphetse and the first battle. But his reasons are not good. He
says that the Persians wanted to reorganise themselves* before
attacking, and that the Greeks " clearly intended to wait to be attacked."
To this it may be replied that the Greeks did, as a matter of fact, take
the offensive first, and that it was clearly their game to strike before the
Persians had recovered from the disorganization caused by the tempest.
In the chronology on the Artemisium side there seems to be nothing
that is on independent grounds open to objection, and therefore we must
look on the side of Thermopylae. The key to the synchronism of the
two series of operations is given in the statement! that Xerxes had
arrived in the Malian country two days before the fleet arrived at
Aphetae.
lofie[$\r]KU)? 'tfV KCU irj Tpcrcuos e? MijXie'av.
There is no reason for questioning this date if we are to accept any dates
whatever from Herodotus. But it is to be observed that the arrival of
Xerxes within the border of Malis on a particular day does not imply
that he traversed Malis and encamped before Thermopylae, in the land of
Trachis, on the same day. The next chronological statement is that
Xerxes allowed four days to pass from his arrival in Trachis, and
attacked the Greeks on the fifth.J Now this delay seems—quite apart
from the difficulty of bringing the result into harmony with the diary
of Artemisium—extremely unlikely. When we take into account the
difficulty of provisioning the immense Persian host, we must gravely
doubt whether Xerxes would have deferred the attack for four days.
The motive which Herodotus assigns for this delay confirms our sus-
picions. Xerxes sees the Lacedaemonians outside the wall engaged in
gymnastics and combing their hair. Surprised at their small number and
their indifference to the danger which menaced them, he has a conver-
sation with the banished King Demaratus, who sets forth the bravery
of his Spartan countrymen, and assures him they have resolved to risk
* " Und die Meldung von der Umgehung abwarten."—A consideration which we can now dis-
regard.
t vii., 196. X v"-> 2 I ° -
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their lives. But Xerxes would not believe him, and felt confident that
they would presently run away. For this reason, tXirigwv alei <r<t>ea<>
airohpijaeaOai, he delayed the attack for four days.
The delay, therefore, has what may be called an Herodotean motive.
It is in fact part of one of those anecdotes by which Herodotus dra-
matically brings out the surprise of the Persian at Hellas, a surprise
which enhances the ultimate Hellenic triumph.
§ 17. We are therefore entitled to discard the statement of the delay
of four days as part of an anecdote. The argument may be briefly
expressed thus: The diary of Artemisium is inconsistent with the
diary of Thermopylae. One must therefore be wrong. We cannot
point out, on independent grounds, a flaw in the diary of Artemisium,
but we can discover an extremely suspicious statement in the diary of
Thermopylae. We are therefore entitled to revise the dates of the
events at Thermopylae by the dates of the events at Artemisium.
The conclusion, therefore, is that the fighting at Thermopylae took
place (not on days 18, 19, 20, but) on days 16, 17, 18. Thus one day
(15) elapsed between the arrival of Xerxes within Malian territory, and
his first attack on Thermopylae."
§ 18. The general results of this discussion may be shown in the
following table:—
Day 12 Arrival of Persian fleet opposite Sriathos towards evening. "Two hundred" ships
despatched to sail round Euboea* Fifty-three Athenian vessels sent («n the night)
to guard the Euripus.
,, 13 Storm.
,, 14 Arrival of Xerxes in Malian land. Storm continues.
„ 15 Xerxes encamps before Thermopylae. Storm continues.
„ 16 Xerxes attacks Thermopylae. Persian fleet moves to Aphetas. Scyllias deserts and
tells the Greeks of the Persian losses in the storm. First sea battle (afternoon).
,, 17 Renewed attack oia Thermopylae. The fifty-three Attic vessels return to Artemisium.
Second naval engagement.
,, 18 Thermopylae taken. Third sea battle. News of Thermopylae received at Artemis-
ium (eveming.)
2. THERMOPYLAE.
§ 19. If it is hard to say from what source Herodotus derived his
account of the operations at Artemisium, it is clear enough where he
collected his materials for the story of Thermopylae. His narrative is
laid out for the glorification of the Lacedaemonians, and this feature,
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taken along with the anecdotes which he introduces about Demaratus
and Gorgo, enables us to attain a moral certainty that he gives mainly
the Spartan account, which he learned at Sparta.* It is easy to see
that it is an account in which actual military facts are of no moment,
and all the details are calculated to enhance the courage of the Spartans,
and render it almost superhuman.
§ 20. About seven thousand Greeks marched to defend the pass of
Thermopylae. The numbers given by Herodotus here are quite
credible : 300 Spartans, 2,120 Arcadians, 80 Mycenaeans, 400
Corinthians, 200 Phliasians; that is 3,100 Peloponnesian hoplites.f
The total, however, is inconsistent with the epigram of Simonides
(quoted by Herodotus), % which states that the pass was defended by
" four thousand from the Peloponnesus,"
IK HeXoTrovvaaov
But another passage of Herodotus enables us to solve this difficulty
by proving that the Spartans were accompanied by Helots, § and it is
permissible to assume that the number of these light-armed troops
amounted to 900 or 1,000 From Northern Greece, || 700 Thespians, 400
Thebans, 1,000 Phocians, and the whole army of the Locrians—say 1,000
to take the smallest number—joined Leonidas and brought up the total
number to more than 7,000.
The Phocians, on account of their local knowledge, were set to guard
the road over the mountain, so that Leonidas had at his disposal at
least six thousand men for the defence of the pass. Having successfully
resisted the Persian attack for two successive days, he is informed
during the night of the second day, by deserters, that Hydarnes and the
Immortals have been sent by the mountain road to take him in the
rear. This news is confirmed about dawn by his scouts, who, perhaps,
also brought the news that the Phocians had offered no resistance but
had fled to the heights. Leonidas held a council of war. Some were
for retreating, others for remaining; and finally the various contingents
acted as they severally thought good. The Spartans, Thebans and
* For further evidence on this point, see below, § 26. t vii., 202.
% vii., 228. The words of Herodotus suggest that this epigram was not written by Simonides,
but the Simonidean authorship has been vindicated by Bergk and others.
§ See below, § 26. || vii., 202, 203.
93
THE CAMPAIGN OF ARTEMIS1UM AND THERMOPFL^.
Thespians remained; the rest dispersed, each to his own city. Herodotus
adds the story—and professes his own belief in it—that Leonidas, seeing
that the confederates were lukewarm, urged them to depart and save
their lives, leaving him and the Spartans to die at their posts. He
supports * this story by one of those oracles (composed post eventum),
which he is always so ready to use as authoritative evidence: either
Sparta was to be destroyed, or a Spartan king, of the seed of Heracles,
was to die. Partly on account of this oracle, and partly to monopolize
the glory for Sparta, did Leonidas, according to the historian, dismiss
the allies ; this, h& thinks, is more likely than that the allies should have
quarrelled and departed indecorously. The Thespians would not desert
the Lacedaemonians, but the Thebans were detained, against their will,
as hostages. In the subsequent battle, the Thebans fought because
they were compelled, until the pass was actually carried; but, while the
Spartans and Thespian sr who still remained, rallied on the hillock, and
fell fighting, the Thebans held out their hands and begged for mercy,
crying that they were medizers, " which was perfectly true," and were
fighting against their will. Their lives were spared but they had to
endure the indignity of being branded.
§ 21. The unfair treatment of the Thebans in this narrative strikes
every reader, and it furnished a count in the indictment made out by
the writer of the treatise De Malignitate Herodoti. Grote himself rejects
the statement that Leonidas forcibly constrained the Thebans to remain,
on rational and obvious grounds. " How," he asks, " could these
Thebans serve as hostages ? Against what evil were they intended to
guard Leonidas, or what advantage could they confer upon him ?
Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be no way desirable."
We might add another question," Would it, in the given circumstances,
have been possible for him to coerce four hundred hoplites, even if it
had been desirable ? " No one can hesitate to accept Grote's conclusion
that the Thebans "remained by their own offer." But while Grote is com-
pelled by the merest common-sense to go thus far in discrediting the
story against the Thebans, he does not hesitate to accept the rest in part.
He turns " with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the
Thebans," but he dismisses the incident of the ignominious branding
" as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in
ro ya
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Greece after the repulse of Xerxes." But have we a right to make this
distinction ? If we accept the desertion, why should we reject the
branding ? Grote has grasped the right principle for the criticism of
the tale, but has applied it arbitrarily and inconsistently. We cannot
avoid regarding the whole tale as an invention of " strong anti-Theban
feeling "—a tale told with spiteful pleasure at Athens and, doubtless,
at Sparta too. The Thebans, of course, had a very different tale to tell.
Unfortunately, the history of the Boeotian author, Aristophanes, is not
preserved, but Plutarch, in his treatise on the "Kakoetheia " of Herodo-
tus, quotes him to show the inaccuracy of the Herodotean story, even
on such a point as the name of the Theban commander.
§ 22. The fact is—and historians have not sufficiently realised it—
that the conduct of the northern Greeks, and especially of the Thebans,
before the conquest of northern Greece by Xerxes, was interpreted in
the light of their conduct after that conquest, and consequently an
injustice has been done them. Neither the Thessalians—except the
Aleuad house—nor the Boeotians, nor any of the other Greek peoples,
wished to submit to the Mede; they would all have been glad to keep
him out. The Thessalians desired that their own northern frontier
should be selected as the scene for the Pan-Hellenic defence. When
the troops which had been sent to Tempe gave up this idea and retired,
all the northern lands as far as Thermopylae were at once exposed to the
invader ; the inhabitants were not strong enough to undertake resistance
with any prospect of success, and accordingly it was a mere act of self-
preservation when the Thessalians, Achaians, Dolopians, Malians, and
the rest, gave the tokens of submission to Xerxes. Thermopylae was
the next point, and if it were taken, northern Greece as far as the
Isthmus was lost, for it was certain that the Peloponnesian confederates
would at once retire to the Isthmus. The submission of Boeotia,
which had no fleet to fall back on like Athens, was a matter of course
once Thermopylae were taken, but in the meantime it was the interest
of Bceotia that Thermopylae should not be taken. It must be further
remembered that the northern Greeks had to found their policy on two
calculations : the probability that Greece would be unable to resist the
Persians, and the probability that, when it came to the point, they would
themselves be deserted by the Peloponnesian confederates. The justice of
the second calculation is strikingly shown by the conduct of the Pelo-
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ponnesians on the eve of Salamis. If they had had their way, they
would have sacrificed their confederates, the Athenians and Aeginetans,
caring only for the safety of the Peloponnesus. These calculations
explain the policy of the northern Greeks in not joining the Synedrion
of the Probuli at Isthmus. They had to take care not to compromise
themselves with Xerxes; their conduct was equivocal, just because they
did not live in the Peloponnesus. But the Thessalian message propos-
ing that Tempe should be defended, and the presence of the Theban
contingent at Thermopylae, showed that they submitted from necessity
and not from preference.
§ 23. From this digression, which was necessary to explain the
position of the Thebans, we must return to consider the position of the
whole Greek force. Herodotus represents the defence of the pass, once
Hydarnes came round by the mountain road, as a forlorn hope. The
place could no longer be defended with any hope of success, and in this
case the most natural course for the defenders was to retreat. Leonidas,
however, remained to die. His motive, according to Herodotus, was
partly belief in an oracle, and partly patriotic ambition. " Spartans,"
he said," must not desert their post," and modern historians accentuate
this point. But would retreat from Thermopylae, if it had been a
rational course, have been condemned by the military code of Sparta ?
Eurybiades was a Spartan commander, and yet, according to Herodotus,
he was quite ready to retreat from his post at Artemisium. It seems to
me that historians confuse two things. If Leonidas had been a subordinate
officer, posted by his commander-in-chief to defend the pass, then,
indeed, under no circumstances would he have been justified in aban-
doning it in the eyes of the jealous Lycurgean state. But the case of the
commander-in-chief himself is wholly different. If Leonidas, as a
discreet general, had thought it advisable to fall back, he certainly
could not have been blamed. But granting that a superfluity of valour
might have determined the three hundred to die for the greater glory
of Sparta, and to give the Persians the firstfruits of Hellenic prowess,
there are good reasons, it seems to me, for concluding that the motives
of Leonidas were different, and, if less sublime, more within the limits
of ordinary human reason.
§ 24. The significant fact in the situation is that not only the
Spartans, who, it is alleged, durst not leave their post, but the Thespians,
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and also the Thebans, remained in the pass. Now whatever may be
said of the Thespians, who like the Platseans played a noble part
in the Persian war, no one will be ready to go so far in opposition to
the malignity of Herodotus as to maintain that they too determined to
die, because it was dishonourable to desert their post, in contrast with
the Arcadians and other Peloponnesians. Allowing on one side for the
glorification of Sparta, as on the other for the calumniation of Thebes,
we have to deal with the simple fact that the Spartans, Thespians, and
Thebans remained to fight in the pass. When the glory of Thermopylae
was monopolized by the Spartans, the Thespians were rather set aside—
Herodotus gives them somewhat perfunctory praise—while the presence
of the Thebans was explained in a discreditable way.
But the obvious inference is that the Spartans, Thebans, and
Thespians held the pass because the defence was still feasible, although
demanding bravery of no common quality, and not because the
Spartans refused to desert an untenable post.
§ 25. When it was known that Hydarnes was marching round, and
had dissipated the Phocians, it is clear that two courses were open to
Leonidas and his followers. They might either all retreat, or they
might adopt a bolder course, and still, if fortune favoured them, hold
the pass. The possibility of doing this would depend on employ-
ing against the company of Hydarnes the same stratagem which the
Persians were employing against the Greeks. It would be necessary
to attack Hydarnes on two sides, so that he should have to deal not
only with the defenders of the eastern gate of the pass, but also with
other troops posted on the east side of the point where he descended
from Mount Kallidromos. With a disposition of this kind, the case of
the Greeks was by no means hopeless.
The actual facts of the case, arrived at by criticising and allowing
for the motives which play the chief part in the story of Herodotus,
demand such a strategical reconstruction. The fate of the defenders in
the actual pass depended on the bravery and success of the main body
of the Greek army, which attacked the rear of Hydarnes. The event
proved that they were not equal to their task, and those who did not
fall fled each to his own city.
§ 26. The truth of this reconstruction, bold as it may seem, is con-
firmed by the undesigned testimony of Herodotus himself. According
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to his narration in the Seventh Book, only the Spartans and Thespians
(and probably a few of the Thebans, while they still perforce fought)
were slain, on the last day; and on the two former days " apparently
not many"* hoplites had fallen. But in the Eighth Book we are
told t that 4,000 corpses strew the place. Grote explains this discre-
pancy by the assumption, that " a considerable number of helots " had
remained with the Spartans in the pass. It has also been suggested
that the number 4,000, has been thoughtlessly taken from the epigram
of Simonides, where it represents the number of Peloponnesians who
fought at Thermopylae, not those who fell.
It must be observed that this anecdote of the corpse-show, as it
comes in a different place, so also obviously comes from a different
source, from the narrative in the Seventh Book. If it belongs to the
framework of that narrative, the number of the corpses would certainly
have been put at a little over one thousand, the total sum of the
Spartan and Thespian forces; this was required by the Spartan
complexion of the whole story. Nothing could betray more
clearly the different origin of the two passages than the contrast
between the studious ignoring of the helots in the Seventh Book, and
the mention of them in the Eighth. Following implicitly his Spartan
source in the main narrative, Herodotus carelessly involved himself in
an inconsistency between the total of the Peloponnesian troops obtained
by the addition of his items, and the number stated in the epigram of
Simonides which he quotes. The inconsistency, as we saw, is removed
by the evidence of the non-Spartan source, which he has used in the
25th Chapter of Book VIII. ; not merely a non-Spartan, but perhaps
even an anti-Spartan source. A curious sentence in the account of the
Persian exhibition of the dead bodies suggests that the anecdote
was partly intended to combat the exclusive rights of Lacedaemon
with Thespiae to the glories of Thermopylae. We read that all those
who came to see the dead
^7T((jTeaTO TOW Kei/JLevov? etvai TravTCis AaKebai/Aoviovs KCU ©e<T7nea?, opeovTes
leal TOP? eiXttiTar,
"Supposed that the dead were all Lacedaemonians and Thespians,
seeing the helots also." This statement, if it were intended to imply
that the " supposition " were true, would be in glaring opposition to
* Grote's words, c. xl. ad fin. t c. 25.
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the immediately following statement that the whole number of dead
was 4,000. It is clearly meant that the supposition is false, and that
it obtained currency among the Persians owing to the presence of
helots.
In any case, there underlies this story a number of dead totally
inconsistent with that implied in the narration of the Seventh Book,
which is obviously founded on a highly coloured Spartan version. The
hypothesis which I have suggested explains the greater number of
dead; for to those who fell in the pass are to be added those who were
slain in fighting against the troops of Hydarnes outside the pass.
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